Volume 63
Issue 6 V.63, Tolle Lege

Article 6

6-15-2019

Sarbanes-Oxley and CEO Accountability: Looking for a Corporate
Scapegoat in S.E.C. V. Jensen
Jacqueline Dakin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jacqueline Dakin, Sarbanes-Oxley and CEO Accountability: Looking for a Corporate Scapegoat in S.E.C. V.
Jensen, 63 Vill. L. Rev. 126 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss6/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Dakin: Sarbanes-Oxley and CEO Accountability: Looking for a Corporate Sc

SARBANES-OXLEY AND CEO ACCOUNTABILITY: LOOKING FOR A
CORPORATE SCAPEGOAT IN S.E.C. V. JENSEN
JACQUELINE DAKIN*
“If there were a bullseye painted in black on the back of the CFO, now it
would be painted in red.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

If asked for the common characteristics of chief executive officers (CEOs)
and chief financial officers (CFOs), several things might come to mind: creative,
extroverted, risk-taking, or innovative.2 Maybe even crazy.3 But what about
dishonest?4 In 2002, just prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
*
J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A.,
2016, University of Connecticut. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Robert and Michelle
Dakin, and sisters, Jennifer and Kristen Dakin, for their unwavering love and support. I would
also like to thank everyone on the Villanova Law Review for making the publication of this Note
possible.
1.
Randy Myers, The Rising Risk of Being CFO, CFO MAGAZINE (Dec. 19, 2016),
http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-management/2016/12/rising-risk-cfo/ [https://perma.cc/AZV6-QUJJ]
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting John J. Carney). Carney opined that “[t]here’s not
a public company in America that could withstand a full, substantive audit and not have errors
and mistakes found . . . .” Id. He emphasized the fear that potential individual liability will
ignite in CEOs and CFOs—even those who act honestly and are diligent in their certifications.
See id. (internal quotation marks).
2. See Stephanie Chung, 10 Personality Traits Successful CEOs Share, INC. (Apr. 10,
2017),
https://www.inc.com/stephanie-chung/10-personality-traits-every-ceo-shouldhave.html [https://perma.cc/RH7B-EAA6] (writing that successful CEOs have “[s]trong
communication skills,” are “[w]illing[] to take calculated risks,” and “[t]hink[] outside the
box”).
3. See Jeff Bercovici, Why (Some) Psychopaths Make Great CEOs, FORBES (June 14,
2011, 08:46 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2011/06/14/why-somepsychopaths-make-great-ceos/#2bec30dc261a
[https://perma.cc/5GAM-GLZV]
(“[T]he
incidence of psychopathy among CEOs is about 4 percent, four times what it is in the population
at large.” (citing Jon Ronson, THE PSYCHOPATH TEST: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE MADNESS
INDUSTRY (2011))); see also Lindsay Dodgson, Here’s Why CEOs Often Have the Traits of a
Psychopath, BUS. INSIDER (July 7, 2017, 05:42 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ceosoften-have-psychopathic-traits-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/6Y3W-FHA3] (writing that “CEOs
are more likely to be psychopaths”); Gene Marks, 21 Percent of CEOs Are Psychopaths. Only
21 Percent?, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-smallbusiness/wp/2016/09/16/gene-marks-21-percent-of-ceos-are-psychopaths-only-21percent/?utm_term=.9a6f22621391 [https://perma.cc/Y62D-DYSC] (providing results of study
of 261 United States senior corporate professionals). According to the cited study, one in five
CEOs are psychopaths, in contrast to about one in 100 among the general population. See id.
4. See Matti Rantanen, Reasons of Systemic Collapse in Enron, in SYSTEMS
INTELLIGENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND EVERYDAY LIFE 171, 171 (Raimo P. Hamalainen and Esa
Saarinen eds., 2007) http://sal.aalto.fi/publications/pdf-files/rran07.pdf (studying how longterm CEO’s leadership led to immoral behavior at Enron); see also Lessons from the Enron
Scandal,
MARKKULA
CENTER
FOR
APPLIED
ETHICS
(Mar.
5,
2002),
https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/business-ethics/resources/lessons-from-the-enronscandal/ [https://perma.cc/2ZYC-UB63] (interviewing Kirk Hanson, executive director of the
Markkula Center for Applied Ethics). When asked why the collapse of Enron happened,
Hanson cited senior executives trying to “cover up their own failures” and a “lack of truthfulness
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2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley or SOX), widespread dishonesty and misconduct by
corporate officers resulted in many highly-publicized scandals, leading to public
outrage.5 Sarbanes-Oxley was the hastily drafted response to that outrage.6
Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley (“section 304” or “SOX 304”) created penalties
for CEOs and CFOs when misconduct caused noncompliance with reporting
requirements.7 Section 304 provides that, when an issuer’s misconduct requires
the company to prepare an accounting restatement, the CEOs and CFOs must
reimburse the issuer incentive-based compensation, as well as any profits from
the sale of securities earned during the twelve-month period following the first
issuance of the erroneous financial statement.8
Because of its quick drafting, the statute’s language is ambiguous in several
respects, including whether the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
can seek disgorgement of compensation from an issuer’s CEO or CFO.9
Disgorgement is the act of giving back illegally obtained profits.10 The ambiguity
occurs because it is not the CEO’s or CFO’s personal misconduct, but rather the
misconduct of a lower-level employee that results in the issuing of an accounting
by management.” See id.
5. See Isaac U. Kimes, Note, Unfettered Clawbacks—Why Section 304 of the SarbanesOxley Act Requires a Personal Misconduct Standard, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 797, 798 (2012)
(suggesting that the corporate scandals which prompted the enactment of the statute “rocked”
the country and the resulted in “increase in public anger towards big business created a policy
window that facilitated the passage of SOX”).
6. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 927–28 (2003) (writing that SarbanesOxley was political response to pressure caused by successive corporate scandals); see also
Kimes, supra note 5, at 798–99 (noting increase in public anger from scandals and criticism
that Sarbanes-Oxley was hastily constructed and heavily politicized); Gregory C. Leon,
Stigmata: The Stain of Sarbanes-Oxley on U.S. Capital Markets, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 125, 127
(2007) (calling Sarbanes-Oxley Act response to scandals surrounding corporate icons and
“Congress’s answer to the corporate wrong doing of the 1990s”).
7. See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 956 (noting penalties for CEOs and CFOs were
intended to de-incentivize financial manipulation); see also Kimes, supra note 5, at 800
(explaining how section 304 functions).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2012). Section 2(4) of the Securities Act of 1933, an “issuer” is
“every person who issues or proposes to issue any security.” 15 U.S.C. § 77B(a)(4); see also
15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(8) (defining “issuer” as “any person who issues or proposes to issue any
security”).
9. See Matthew J. O’Hara, Financial Fraud: New Ninth Circuit Case on SOX Clawback
Leaves Unresolved Issues, 2 CORP GOVERNANCE REP. (BNA) No. 12, Dec. 5, 2016,
(highlighting that statute has been criticized for its ambiguities, such as: (1) it fails to define
misconduct, and more specifically, it fails to state whether the misconduct of the issuer needs
to be intentional in order to trigger disgorgement under section 304; and (2) it fails to state
whether there needs to be a causal connection between the amount of money that the SEC seeks
to “claw back” and the increase in compensation resulting from the misconduct).
10. See Disgorgement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
disgorgement as “[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained) on demand
or by legal compulsion”). It has generally been considered a restitution remedy that is designed
to prevent a conscious wrongdoer from profiting from their wrongdoing. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 2011) (noting
object of disgorgement); see also id. at cmt. a (“Restitution measured by the defendant’s
wrongful gain is frequently called ‘disgorgement.’”); cf. id. at § 51(5)(d) (stating “[a] claimant
who seeks disgorgement of profit has the burden of producing evidence permitting at least a
reasonable approximation of the amount of the wrongful gain”).
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restatement.11 In this context, section 304 would allow the SEC to “recapture,”
from senior officers, any incentive-based compensation they received during the
years in which the corporate issuer failed to comply with reporting
requirements.12
Until recent years, SEC enforcement of section 304 was virtually nonexistent.13 The statute’s ambiguities are likely to blame for why the SEC has so
scarcely enforced it since its enactment in 2002.14 It was not until 2007, five
years after the enactment of the statute, that the SEC even attempted to enforce
section 304.15 Further, the SEC did not seek disgorgement of compensation under
section 304 from an individual who did not personally engage in misconduct until
as late as 2009.16

11. See O’Hara, supra note 9 (discussing scope of misconduct under section 304 with
cases showing that there are many ambiguities).
12. See S.E.C. v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS, 2012 WL 5499497, at *5 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 13, 2012) (“[I]t was Congress’s purpose to recapture the additional compensation paid to
a CEO during any period in which the corporate issuer was not in compliance with financial
reporting requirements.” (quoting S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (D. Ariz.
2010))).
13. See id. at *3 (“For reasons best known to the SEC, the Commission has been
historically reluctant to utilize § 304 in the ten years since Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted.”).
14. See Kimes, supra note 5, at 822 (“The reason why the SEC has not actively pursued
section 304 claims against CEOs regardless of their misconduct may be the ambiguity of the
statute.”); Allison List, Note, The Lax Enforcement of Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley: Why is
the SEC Ignoring its Greatest Asset in the Fight Against Corporate Misconduct, 70 OHIO ST.
L. J. 195, 222 (2009) (suggesting that section 304’s ambiguity may be one reason why SEC has
failed to enforce it more vigorously). It has even been reported that members of the Commission
were (and perhaps still are) divided on their support of the provision. See William McLucas et
al.,
SOX
304
“Clawback”
as
an
Enforcement
Tool,
WILMERHALE,
http://news.acc.com/accwm/downloads/WilmerHale_123110.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5JVXUSV] (noting, in 2010, Bloomberg reported that “SEC’s five commissioners have been
arguing on how to use the clawback authority since July 2009” (quoting SEC Rift on When to
Claw Back Bonus May Leave Policy in Limbo, BLOOMBERG (BNA) (Aug. 6, 2010))).
15. See List, supra note 14, at 217 (noting that SEC admitted its first time using section
304 was in 2007). In a press release dated May 31, 2007, the SEC announced that it would be
using section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for the first time in pursuing charges against four
senior officers of Mercury Interactive, LLC. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Settles with Mercury
Interactive and Sues Former Mercury Officers for Stock Option Backdating and Other
Fraudulent Conduct (May 31, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-108.htm
[https://perma.cc/997Y-FKJP] (“The Commission’s first ever use of Section 304 of SarbanesOxley . . . reflects the Commission’s willingness to use all available remedies to deprive such
senior officers of illicit gains.”). In S.E.C. v. Mercury Interactive, LLC., four senior officers
personally participated in an “array of fraudulent conduct,” including, but not limited to,
backdating stock options. See id. (quoting Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of Commission’s
Division of Enforcement). In order to conceal their fraudulent activity, they falsified a number
of documents over a five-year period. See id. Their behavior was purposefully designed so that
they could award themselves and other employees “secret compensation,” all the while
deceiving shareholders. See id. The numbers were shocking: over the five-year period,
Mercury had backdated forty-five stock option grants to executives and employees and failed
to record over $258 million in compensation expenses. See id. It was clear that the fraudulent
activity was not the result of an innocent mistake or just lazy accounting: two of the charged
officers even created a PowerPoint presentation titled “Our Hidden Backlog . . . What Any
Analyst Would Love to Get Their Hands On!” See id.
16. See Feds Defend First Use of Sarbanes-Oxley’s ‘Clawback’, 25 ANDREWS CORP.
OFF. & DIR. LIAB. LITIG. REP. (WESTLAW) 3 (2009) (noting that this was first time that SEC
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Instead of section 304’s implementation resulting in a decrease in the
issuance of accounting restatements, there was actually a significant increase in
the issuance of restatements in the decade following section 304’s enactment.17
In 2001, the year before Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, only about 2% of
exchange-listed firms issued accounting restatements while in 2011, roughly 9%
of exchange-listed firms issued such restatements.18 Despite the vast number of
restatements, the SEC only pursued a handful of claims, many of which were
attached to other more serious charges and were ultimately dropped or ended in
settlement.19
S.E.C. v. Jensen20 was the first time a court of appeals addressed the question
of whether personal misconduct on the part of the CEO or CFO is required for
the SEC to seek enforcement of section 304.21 The United States Court of
had relied solely on section 304 to “claw back” compensation awarded to senior officers who
were not themselves guilty of accounting fraud); see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Seeks
Return of $4 Million in Bonuses and Stock Sale Profits from Former CEO of CSK Auto Corp.,
Enforcement Action Is First Solely Under “Clawback” Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (July
22, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-167.htm [https://perma.cc/2DEXFE95] (announcing that “Jenkins [CEO] was captain of the ship and profited during the time
that CSK was misleading investors about the company’s financial health”). In S.E.C. v. Jenkins,
the court faced an issue of first impression: “whether Section 304 requires a CEO to reimburse
an issuer even where the CEO committed no personal wrongdoing.” 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1073 (D. Ariz. 2010). Defendant Jenkins was the CEO of CSK Auto Corporation from 1997 to
2007. See id. at 1072. In 2002, 2003, and 2004, CSK filed inaccurate financial statements that
overstated the amount of gross income the company generated in those years. See id. (noting
that “CSK reported greater pretax income than the company actually earned”). Jenkins
personally certified each of these inaccurate financial statements. See id. Then, in 2004, CSK
filed a restatement, again certified by Jenkins, in an apparent attempt to correct those
inaccuracies; however, the restatement was also materially inaccurate. See id. at 1072–73.
Finally, in 2007, CSK filed a second restatement, which restated the financial statements for
2002–2004. See id. at 1073. The SEC, although it did not file any civil complaints or criminal
indictments against Jenkins, sought enforcement of section 304 to require Jenkins to disgorge
some two million dollars in incentive-based compensation he received in the years 2003–2005.
See id.
17. See J. Royce Fichtner et al., The Unfulfilled Promise of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304:
A Call for Pervasive Enforcement, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 49, 75–76 (2015) (noting that
even though section 304 seemingly creates incentive for companies to limit restatements, total
number of restatements exceeds number before SOX).
18. See id. (stating that, in 2001, there were 7,921 exchange-listed firms and 163 of them
issued restatements while, in 2011, there were 5,552 exchange-listed firms and 499 of them
issue restatements).
19. See id. at 76 (acknowledging that SEC did not use section 304 in way that it was
intended). Fichtner gives several examples of high-profile cases that involved corporation’s
restating financial statements as a result of “clear misconduct” where “the SEC inexplicably
chose to use its prosecutorial discretion to exempt large portions of collectible monies.” See id.
at 77 (citing to cases where disgorgement seemed clear but SEC decided to exempt portions of
monies); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Clawbacks Without Claws, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 10,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/clawbacks-without-claws-in-a-sarbanesoxley-tool.html [https://perma.cc/54Q8-G38M] (condemning the SEC for its failure to utilize
section 304 and seek its enforcement against officers). Morgenson called the statute a
“clawback[] without claws” and Sarbanes-Oxley “a bark decidedly worse than its bite.” See id.
20. 835 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2016).
21. See id. at 1115 (stating that they are unaware of any circuit court that has addressed
this issue); see also O’Hara, supra note 9 (stating that Ninth Circuit became first appeals court
to address whether clawback provision in section 304 required personal misconduct).
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, looking to the text and legislative history of the
statute, reached the conclusion that the SEC could seek disgorgement of
compensation from CEOs and CFOs absent personal misconduct.22
Nevertheless, the court did not consider the extent to which such an interpretation
conflicts with Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory scheme, as well as other securities laws
and common law principles.23
This Note argues that the Jensen court should have considered in its analysis
(1) Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory scheme; (2) other federal securities laws; and (3)
whether disgorgement is an appropriate remedy for individuals who have not
committed wrongdoing.24 Moreover, the court missed an important opportunity
to bring some clarity to the ambiguous statute by failing to define what type of
“misconduct” is required to trigger section 304, while the concurrence’s proposed
definition not only conflicts with previous interpretations of misconduct, but
would make CEOs and CFOs strictly liable for the intentional acts of their
employees.25 Part II of this Note provides background, including the legislative
22. See Jensen, 835 F.3d at 1116 (“Here, disgorgement is merited to prevent corporate
officers from profiting from the proceeds of misconduct, whether it is their own misconduct or
the misconduct of the companies they are paid to run.”). The court’s analysis has been met with
dissatisfaction and criticized as “draconian” for its failure to clarify unclear provisions of the
statute that have plagued the courts below them. See id. at 1123 (Bea, J., concurring) (criticizing
majority opinion as “announc[ing] broad, but unclear rules” and “leav[ing] for another day
important questions . . . about the precise scope of the rules”); see also O’Hara, supra note 9
(“The Ninth Circuit thus placed its approval on a draconian reading of the reach of the statute
by holding that it may be employed to claw back large amounts paid to top executives who
engaged in no wrongdoing.”). It seems that, despite the fact that a court of appeals finally
addressed this issue, the area of the law remains fairly unsettled and it is unclear how it will
develop in the future and what impact, if any, the court’s holding in Jensen will have moving
forward. See O’Hara, supra note 9.
23. For a discussion of the manner in which the Jensen court’s interpretation of section
304 conflicts with Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory scheme, other federal securities laws, and
common law equity principles, see infra notes 114–42 and accompanying text.
24. See Kimes, supra note 5, at 824 (writing that section 304 should be considered in
light of the rest of the Act and that “[t]he relationship between sections 302 and 304 mandates
that section 304 have a scienter requirement”); see also Notice of Motion and Motion by
Defendant Maynard L. Jenkins to Dismiss the Complaint; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof at 12, S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010)
(No. CV-09-01510-PHX-GMS) (writing that “construing section 304 as establishing a new
substantive offense, untethered to any wrongdoing by the CEO or CFO, would be inconsistent
with” rules of statutory construction and common law principles); Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendant Peter L. Jensen’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
18–19, S.E.C. v. Jensen, 2012 WL 4339871 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2012) (No. CV11-05316R
(AGRx)) (arguing that SEC cannot seek disgorgement of gains from defendant that were not
result of fraudulent behavior).
25. See O’Hara, supra note 9 (noting that “the question of what is ‘misconduct’ under
SOX 304 remains a question on which reviewing courts have yet to speak”). O’Hara noted that
requiring intentional misconduct on the part of the issuer would “raise[] the thorny question of
when an agent’s conduct can be imputed to the corporation.” See id. O’Hara also emphasized
that the concurrence’s interpretation of “misconduct” differs substantially from how other
courts have interpreted the term. See id. (concluding that concurrence is not consistent with
other courts and SEC); cf. Sabella v. Scantek Med, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 453(CM)(HBP), 2009 WL
3233703, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (giving “willful misconduct” its “ordinary meaning,”
which court took to be “[m]isconduct committed voluntarily and intentionally” (quoting
Misconduct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004))). The court noted that “misconduct,”
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history of Sarbanes-Oxley and relevant case law.26 Part III discusses the facts of
Jensen.27 Part IV provides a narrative analysis of the court’s reasoning in
Jensen.28 Part V of this Note analyzes the court’s reasoning in Jensen and argues
for an alternative analysis of the statute.29 Part VI concludes by discussing the
potential impact of the Ninth Circuit’s holding.30
II. BACKGROUND: “NO MORE EASY MONEY FOR CORPORATE
CRIMINALS, JUST HARD TIME”31
Sarbanes-Oxley, specifically section 304, is notoriously ambiguous.32 Years
after its enactment, courts, legal commentators, and senior officers are grappling
with how to interpret it.33 In order to understand why there is so much confusion
surrounding Sarbanes-Oxley, this section will first examine the circumstances
under which it was enacted and the Act’s legislative history.34 Then, it will
discuss how the SEC initially applied section 304 narrowly by only seeking its
enforcement against corporate officers who had personally participated in the
fraudulent activity or misconduct.35 Next, this section will analyze cases which
as opposed to “willful misconduct,” is “[a] dereliction of duty; unlawful or improper behavior.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Misconduct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th
ed. 2004)).
26. For a discussion of the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley and accompanying case
law, see infra notes 38–54 and accompanying text.
27. For a further discussion of the facts in Jensen, see infra notes 89–102 and
accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the court’s analysis in Jensen, see infra notes 103–13 and
accompanying text.
29. For a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning in Jensen, see infra notes 114–55 and
accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the impact of Jensen, see infra notes 156–80 and accompanying
text.
31. Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs Bill Aimed at
TIMES
(July
31,
2002),
Fraud
in
Corporations,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/31/business/corporate-conduct-the-president-bush-signsbill-aimed-at-fraud-in-corporations.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/NU39-AYDZ] (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting former U.S. President George W. Bush).
32. See J. Royce Fichtner et al., Clarifying the Original Clawback: Interpreting
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304 Through the Lens of Dodd-Frank Section 954, 10 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1, 2 (2016) (noting reluctance of SEC to enforce Section 304 has
been attributed to “ambiguous language, undefined terms, and open questions surrounding how
to apply the clawback to certain types of incentive-based compensation”); see also Kimes, supra
note 5, at 821–22 (calling section 304 ambiguous); O’Hara, supra note 9 (writing that
“ambiguities continue to lurk in nearly every phrase in this statute”).
33. See Kimes, supra note 5, at 822 (calling section 304 “empty instruction manual” and
noting “CEOs are not provided any instructions to avoid violating section 304”); see also John
F. Savarese & Wayne M. Carlin, SEC Clawbacks of CEO and CFO Compensation, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.
(Sept.
15,
2016)
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/15/sec-clawbacks-of-ceo-and-cfo-compensation/
[https://perma.cc/LF45-H8NY] (noting “key issue” courts have faced in interpreting section
304).
34. For a discussion of the SOX’s legislative history, see infra notes 38–49 and
accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of early enforcement of section 304, see infra notes 55–62 and
accompanying text.
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represent the sudden shift to enforcing section 304 against otherwise innocent
corporate officers.36 Finally, this section will examine the history of the
disgorgement remedy, which allows for a comparison of how it has operated in
the securities laws context in the past, and how it operates as part of section 304.37
A. Haste Makes Waste: A Legislative Response in the Wake of Corporate
Scandal
Sarbanes-Oxley was a response to numerous highly-publicized scandals,
including the infamous collapse of Enron.38 These events caused investors to
question the “integrity of our capital markets” and the soundness of their
investments.39 The legislature had to respond quickly and in April of 2002, the
House of Representatives asked the SEC to determine whether, and if so, under
what conditions, an officer should be required to disgorge profits gained in the
six-month period prior to filing a financial restatement.40 The House of
Representatives stated that if the SEC found that requiring officers or directors to
disgorge their profits was appropriate, they should also identify the requisite
scienter element, suggesting that they contemplated scienter as a prerequisite to
imposing the disgorgement penalty.41 Importantly, the House Committee stated
36. For a discussion of more recent instances of section 304 enforcement, see infra notes
63–73 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of the history of the disgorgement remedy, see infra notes 74–88
and accompanying text.
38. See Scott Barancik, Outback’s Chief Financial Officer Quits, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2005), http://www.sptimes.com/2005/04/22/Business/Outback_s_chief_finan.shtml
[https://perma.cc/CYT3-AU5D] (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley was “created to prevent a repeat
of Enron Corp.-type ethical and financial meltdowns”); see, e.g., 3 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL
& SAMUEL WOLFF, SEC. & FED. CORP. L. § 1.1 (2d ed. 2017) (noting Enron demise created
responses from President, Congressional investigations, bills, and regulatory responses); Joseph
M. McLaughlin & Yafit Cohn, Corporate Litigation: SOX Certification Requirement and
Clawback Provision, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT 1 (Oct. 14, 2016),
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/Publications/nylj_joe-mclaughlin_corporatelitigation_10_14_16.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/WNJ8-HXRR] (stating that SarbanesOxley was “enacted in the wake of several high-profile accounting frauds at public
companies”); Ramachandran Natarajan & Kenneth Zheng, Clawback Provision of SOX,
Financial Misstatements, and CEO Compensation Contracts, J. OF ACCT., AUDITING, & FIN.,
Jan. 23, 2017, at 1 (writing that Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in response to cases like
Enron and WorldCom).
39. See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 38 (stating that investors began to question
markets).
40. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 12 (2002) (the House of Representatives asked the
SEC to “conduct an analysis of whether, and under what conditions, any officer or director of
an issuer should be required to disgorge profits gained . . . in the sale of the securities of such
issuer during the six month period immediately preceding the filing of a restated financial
statement on the part of such issuer”).
41. See id. (asking SEC to “identify the scienter requirement that should be used in order
to determine to impose the requirement to disgorge”). Importantly, the Committee did not
qualify its command to “identify the scienter requirement” with words like “whether” or “if
any.” See id. The fact that the Committee qualified its instruction to the SEC in section 12(a)
shows that they know how to do so when they desire. See id. (instructing the Commission to
conduct analysis of whether disgorgement should be required). In the securities laws context,
scienter has been defined as “the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” See, e.g., Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); cf. Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1362 (10th
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that, if the Commission chose to issue rules pursuant to section 12, it should also
provide adequate safeguards that would ensure officers and directors would only
be subject to the disgorgement penalty for “extreme misconduct.”42
In the months following, and before the Senate passed its own bill, several
other corporate scandals made headlines.43 This is likely what led the Senate to
pass a much harsher bill, which, unlike the House of Representatives’ bill, failed
to direct the SEC to identify a scienter requirement and extended the Houses’ sixmonth time period to twelve months.44 Thereafter, and upon completion of the
Senate bill, both versions of the bill went to a Conference Committee formed by
the House and Senate.45 The Conference Committee ultimately approved a bill
that was, in all material respects, identical to the Senate’s bill.46 The bill went
into effect on July 30, 2002, and stated that if an issuer’s misconduct results in
the issuance of a restatement, the CEO and CFO may be required to repay
incentive-based compensation and profits received from the sale of securities

Cir. 1974) (associating “scienter” with “conscious fault”). See also Racheal E. Schwartz, The
Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep the Corporate
House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1, 6 (2008) (noting that House Committee “contemplated that some
level of scienter be proven before disgorgement could be imposed”).
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 44 (2002) (“The Committee intends that, if the
Commission chooses to issue rules pursuant to this section, it do so only after providing
safeguards and exemptions to ensure that such disgorgement is required only in cases where the
Commission can prove extreme misconduct on the part of that officer or director.”); see also
Schwartz, supra note 41, at 6-7 (quoting House Committee’s explanation of section 12 in
support of statement that the Committee “contemplated [] some level of scienter be proven
before disgorgement could be imposed”).
43. See Jordan Eth & Brian L. Levine, The Jenkins Case: SEC Raises Stakes on
Restatements, 6 No. 8 SEC. LITIG. REP. 1 (2009) (noting “lynch-mob mentality” on the Hill
from additional corporate scandals such as Adelphia, WorldCom, ImClone, and Tyco). See
David Hancock, World-Class Scandal at WorldCom, CBS, (June 26, 2002),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/world-class-scandal-at-worldcom/ (writing that the market got
a “king-sized jolt” when WorldCom revealed accounting scandal on June 25, 2006); Penelope
Patsuris,
The
Corporate
Scandal
Sheet,
FORBES,
(Aug.
26,
2002),
https://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html#2c349b0a57e8 (compiling a list
of major corporate accounting scandals that included 19 scandals occurring between January
and July of 2002); Andrew Ross Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco Executives Charged With $600 Million
TIMES,
(Sept.
13,
2002),
Fraud
Scheme,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/business/2-top-tyco-executives-charged-with-600million-fraud-scheme.html (reporting on the Sept. 12, 2002, indictment of Tyco’s CEO, CFO
and former general counsel); Joseph B. Treaster, Adelphia Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
(June
26,
2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/26/business/adelphia-files-forbankruptcy.html (writing that Adelphia filed for bankruptcy on June 25, 2002, after
investigations by the S.E.C. and two federal grand juries).
44. See S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 26 (2002) (stating that disgorgement applies to 12-month
period prior to restatement). See also Eth & Levine, supra note 43 (recounting Senate’s choice
to not discuss scienter and required disgorgement); cf. Kimes, supra note 5, at 801 (suggesting
that “the Senate’s decision was hastened by the spate of sensational corporate lawbreaking just
prior to its vote”).
45. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1567 (2005) (describing unravelling of conference
committee’s compromise strategy because of additional scandals).
46. See id. (noting that bill was “virtually identical to the Senate bill” as the result of “a
media frenzy and the precipitous drop in the stock market, in conjunction with reelection
concerns”).
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during the twelve-month period following the filing of the non-compliant
statement.47 Initial impressions of the bill varied: some viewed it as necessary
given the recent spate of corporate scandals, while others considered it to be
unduly harsh and intrusive.48 Regardless, it was clear that it would dramatically
change the corporate landscape.49
Before Jensen, only a handful of district courts had occasion to interpret
section 304.50 Most of these courts have interpreted the statute broadly and

47. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2012). The statute provides the following:
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance
of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the
securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall
reimburse the issuer for—
any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that person from
the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with the
Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial
reporting requirement; and any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during
that 12-month period.
Id.
48.
See
Darned
SOX,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Sept.
14,
2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/7914930 [https://perma.cc/3GXQ-78PL] (writing that both
American and foreign firms view Sarbanes-Oxley as “intrusive, expensive and heavy-handed”);
see also John Montana, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Five Years Later: Corporate America Still
Finds SOX Compliance Requirements to be Burdensome, Vague, and Frustrating, 41 INFO.
MGMT. J., no. 6 , Nov. 1, 2007 (“The Act, which sets only the highest level and most general of
requirements but imposes the possibility of substantial penalties for not complying with them,
was immediately criticized by corporate America as being overbroad and vague.”). A survey
found that the [auditing] profession was deeply divided on the benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, and
these differences in opinion existed across rank: from partners, to directors, to managers. See
Nancy T. Hill et al., Auditors’ Reactions to Sarbanes-Oxley, CPA J. (July 2007),
http://archives.cpajournal.com/printversions/cpaj/2007/707/p6.htm [https://perma.cc/HUY4PV9U] (surveying professionals affected by Sarbanes-Oxley and providing both negative and
positive reactions). For example, one partner of a Big Four firm stated that complaints about
the cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley were unwarranted: these internal controls are “the
cost of doing business responsibly” and management will ultimately reap the benefits of such a
system. See id. In contrast, a manager of a Big Four firm stated that Sarbanes-Oxley merely
resulted in “a lot of meaningless flowcharts, checklists, procedures, etc.” See id. The authors
noted that it is “rare” for a profession to be as divided as it is on the value of Sarbanes-Oxley,
and this divide might “indicate just how complex and far-reaching the implementation of SOX
is.” See id.
49. See Leon, supra note 6, at 128 (writing that “SOX altered the face of federal
securities regulation”); see also Craig S. Lerner & Moin A. Yahya, “Left Behind” After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2007) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley
“dramatically escalated penalties for white-collar crimes,” and “diluted the mens rea . . .
requirement for criminal regulatory offenses”); cf. Bumiller, supra note 31 (writing that
President Bush referred to legislation as “the most far-reaching reforms of American business
practices since the time of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt”).
50. See Ninth Circuit Supports Expansive Interpretation of SOX 304, SHEARMAN &
STERLING LLP (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.lit-wc.shearman.com/ninth-circuit-supportsexpansive-interpretation-of-sox-304 [https://perma.cc/3KQU-PRVW] (recognizing that preJensen, no circuit court had addressed whether section 304 requires personal misconduct); see
also, e.g., S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010); S.E.C. v. Life Partners
Holdings, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 615 (W.D. Tex. 2014); S.E.C. v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS,
2012 WL 5499497 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 854
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reached the conclusion that personal misconduct on the part of the officer is not
a prerequisite for section 304 enforcement.51 In doing so, the courts have
typically confined their analysis to the text and legislative history of section 304,
and have declined to explore other canons of interpretation available to them
despite the ambiguities that have surrounded the statute since its enactment in
2002.52 Moreover, most of these courts have spent little time addressing whether
the remedy of disgorgement is merited in the absence of any personal
wrongdoing, and of those that have, the results are contradictory.53 This mirrors
the widespread confusion regarding the application of disgorgement in the
securities law context.54
B. The Early Cases
Until recently, the only instances in which the SEC sought enforcement of
section 304 were in cases against senior officers who had also violated other
securities laws.55 These individuals had personally participated in misconduct,
and thus, the section 304 claim was just one of many claims for relief by the

F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2017); S.E.C. v. Geswein, No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4541303, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 29, 2011).
51. See Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (holding that “specific misconduct of the
issuer’s CEO or CFO” is not required for enforcement of clawback provision); see also S.E.C.
v. Life Partners Holdings, No. 1-12-CV-00033, 2013 WL 12076555, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
19, 2013) (refusing to read personal misconduct element into section 304 and claiming to do so
would be “tantamount to re-writing the statute”); Baker, 2012 WL 5499497, at *5 (holding that
enforcement of section 304 does not require scienter or personal misconduct); Jenkins, 718 F.
Supp. 2d at 1074 (holding that “specific misconduct of the issuer’s CEO or CFO” is not required
for enforcement of clawback provision); cf. Jonathan E. Richman, Ninth Circuit Holds That
SOX Disgorgement of Incentive Compensation Does Not Depend on Executives’ Own
Misconduct, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninthcircuit-holds-sox-disgorgement-incentive-compensation-does-not-depend (noting that while no
appellate court had addressed the issue, several district courts have concluded no personal
misconduct is required).
52. See Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (writing that the court does not need to “resort
to additional canons [of interpretation]” because text of statute clearly reveals Congress’s
intent); see also Baker, 2012 WL 5499497, at *5 (writing that because text of statute is clear, it
is dispositive); supra note 32 for commentators explaining that section 304 is ambiguous.
53. See S.E.C. v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1116 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “the
reimbursement provision is an equitable and not a legal remedy”); see also S.E.C. v. Jasper, 678
F.3d 1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that reimbursement provision in section 304 is
equitable remedy); In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that section 304’s disgorgement remedy is equitable). Contra Baker, 2012 WL
5499497, at *7 (agreeing with SEC that reimbursement has different meaning than
disgorgement); Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (writing that section 304 uses term “reimburse”
so “disgorge” has no application to text of statute).
54. See James Tyler Kirk, Deranged Disgorgement, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
131, 187 (2014) (stating “the chaotic application of disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions
across the circuits is pernicious”).
55. See SEC Seeks Return of $4 Million in Bonuses and Stock Sale Profits from Former
CEO of CSK Auto Corp., supra note 16 (acknowledging Commission had only sought
enforcement of section 304 against wrongdoers in past).
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SEC.56 For example, in S.E.C. v. Mercury Interactive, LLC,57 the SEC filed suit
against the CEO and CFOs of Mercury Interactive, LLC.58 The SEC asserted in
its complaint that the individual defendants had participated in a years-long stock
option backdating scheme, and in the process, violated ten different securities
laws.59 It further sought relief in the form of disgorgement of incentive-based
compensation pursuant to section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.60 The district
court noted that the section 304 “claim” for relief amounted to a single sentence
in the prayer for relief of the SEC’s complaint and called the basis for the section
304 claim entirely unclear.61 This acknowledgement evidences, and is exemplary
of, the subsidiary role that section 304 played in the earlier cases, as well as the
courts’ lack of familiarity with the provision.62
C. The Claws Come Out: A New Trend in SEC Enforcement of Section 304
The SEC made a shocking departure from the aforementioned cases in
S.E.C. v. Jenkins.63 Unlike Mercury and the similar cases that followed, the
SEC’s complaint against Jenkins, the CEO of CSK Auto Corporation, did not
allege that Jenkins had violated a single securities law, or that he had knowledge

56. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Shanahan, 646 F.3d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 2011) (listing numerous
alleged violations of securities laws in addition to Section 304 claim); S.E.C. v. Mercury
Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 3790811, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27,
2010) (listing numerous alleged violations of securities laws). In Shanahan, the SEC filed a
complaint against the CEO of a corporation for, over a period of five years, participating in the
backdating of stock options. See S.E.C. v. Shanahan, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1074–75 (E.D.
Mo. 2008), aff’d, 646 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2011) (describing basis for SEC’s complaint). The
SEC further contended that the defendant had actively participated in concealing the backdating
of the options and approved official documents that he knew contained materially false
information. See id. (describing basis for SEC’s complaint). In total, the SEC charged the
defendant with violating seven different securities laws, and, in addition to the order, they
sought to require Shanahan to repay incentive-based compensation under section 304. See id.
at 1076 (listing allegations against defendant and prayer for relief in SEC’s complaint). In its
opinion, the court acknowledged that the Eighth Circuit had never addressed whether section
304 required the actual filing of restatements. See id. at 1078 (“The Eighth Circuit has never
ruled on whether Section 304 requires the actual filing of restated accounting reports.”).
57. No. 5:07-cv-02822-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 3790811 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010).
58. See id. at *1 (stating that SEC had filed suit against four of Mercury Interactive,
LLC’s senior executives).
59. See id. at *1–2 (listing the alleged violations).
60. See id. at *2 (listing prayer for relief as seeking “permanent injunctive relief,
disgorgement of wrongfully obtained benefits plus prejudgment interest, civil monetary
penalties, an order precluding the individual defendants from serving as officers or directors of
any public company, and repayment of bonuses and stock profits”).
61. See S.E.C. v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. C 077-2822 JF (RS), 2008 WL
4544443, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (“The entirety of the SEC’s ‘claim’ under Section
304 is a single sentence in the prayer . . . . The bases for this claim are entirely unclear.”).
62. See id. (dismissing 304 claim because filing financial statements that need to be
restated did not trigger section 304). In the 2010 order, the court also addressed an issue of first
impression regarding what documents can be considered a “first public issuance or filing”
within the meaning of the statute. See Mercury Interactive, 2010 WL 3790811, at *5 (“There
do not appear to be any cases directly on point.”).
63. 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010); see Kimes, supra note 5, at 801 (writing that
suit against Jenkins “sent a tidal wave through the corporate law community”).
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of or consented to the misconduct of others.64 Rather, the SEC filed separate civil
and criminal charges against two CSK vice presidents, alleging that they had
intentionally concealed their fraudulent activity from Jenkins.65 Jenkins was
ultimately required to disgorge four million dollars of incentive-based
compensation pursuant to section 304, as the district court held that enforcement
of the provision did not require personal misconduct on part of the senior
officer.66 Because the court was addressing an issue of first impression, the court
did not rely on any precedential case law in reaching their conclusion, but instead
relied almost solely on the text and legislative history of the statute.67 The Jenkins
case was not an isolated instance; rather, it started a new trend in SEC
enforcement of section 304.68 After Jenkins, the SEC continued to seek
enforcement of the provision against CEOs and CFOs who had not committed
any wrongdoing.69
64. See Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (acknowledging that SEC did not allege Jenkins
participated in misconduct).
65. See id. (noting that SEC filed civil and criminal complaints against other officers
alleging they had perpetuated fraudulent scheme and hid it from Jenkins).
66. See id. (identifying incentive-based compensation Jenkins received during relevant
periods and ruling for SEC on section 304 claim).
67. See id. at 1074 (noting that text and structure of section 304 led to the conclusion
that no personal misconduct is required).
68. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS, 2012 WL 5499497, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 13, 2012); Slater, Exchange Act Release No. 34-74240, at 5 (Feb. 10, 2015); Diebold,
Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. AE-3137, 2010 WL 2199552, at
*1 (June 2, 2010). In 2010, the SEC brought suit against Diebold, Inc. and three of the
company’s financial officers, alleging they had engaged in fraudulent accounting practices and
charging them with violations of several securities laws. See Diebold, Inc., 2010 WL 2199552,
at *1 (providing factual background for complaint). The SEC filed a separate enforcement
action against O’Dell, Diebold’s former CEO, seeking repayment of certain bonuses and
incentive-based compensation under section 304. See id. at *2 (stating action against O’Dell).
The Commission acknowledged in a press release that they were not alleging any wrongdoing
on part of O’Dell; regardless, O’Dell consented to repaying cash bonuses, shares of Diebold
stock, and stock options. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Diebold and Former Executives
with Accounting Fraud (June 2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-93.htm
[https://perma.cc/SN69-LSGF] (“The SEC has not alleged that O’Dell engaged in the fraud.”).
69. See Baker, 2012 WL 5499497, at *1. In Baker, the SEC sought enforcement of
section 304 against the CEO and CFO of a company that was required to restate quarterly and
annual financial statements due to the alleged fraudulent activities of the company’s senior vice
presidents. See id. at *1. The SEC brought a separate civil action against these individuals,
charging them with various violations of securities laws. See id. at *12 n.1 (writing that SEC
brought separate civil proceeding against vice presidents). They did not allege that the
defendants partook in this fraudulent activity or had committed any conscious wrongdoing, but
rather, argued they were responsible for repayment pursuant to section 304 simply because of
the positions they held at the time of the restatements. See id. at *1 (“Baker and Gluk are not
alleged in the Complaint to have committed any conscious wrongdoing; rather, the SEC argues
they are required to reimburse Arthrocare simply because they were the CEO and CFO at the
time . . . .”). The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas agreed. See id. at *5
(rejecting defendant’s claims); see also Slater, Release No. 34-74240, at 1. In 2015, the SEC
reached another settlement in Slater, where the respondents were required to repay several
hundred thousand dollars to Saba Software, Inc., a Silicon Valley-based company where the
respondents had each served as CFO. See id. at 6 (ordering defendants to reimburse Saba).
Saba had to issue restatements for several fiscal years and two fiscal quarters, as a result of
fraudulent activity that took place in the company’s subsidiary located in India. See id. at 1–2.
The SEC conceded that the respondents, both residents of California, did not participate in the
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Courts interpreting section 304 have no precedential opinions to rely upon,
and they have each focused their analysis around principles of statutory
interpretation.70 Most district courts that have concluded section 304 does not
have a personal misconduct requirement, began their analysis by looking at the
“plain language” of the statute, and concluded that because it was unambiguous,
they did not need to look to other canons of statutory interpretation.71 In addition,
activity, nor did they have knowledge of it. See id. at 1 (noting that Commission is not alleging
defendants committed any wrongdoing). Regardless, because the respondents received bonuses
and benefited financially from the sale of Saba stock during the twelve-month time periods
preceding the issuance of the restatements, it was determined that they had violated section 304
and must repay those profits. See id. at 5–6 (providing holding on Section 304 claim).
70. See, e.g., Baker, 2012 WL 5499497, at *5 (relying primarily on text of statute in
reaching conclusion); Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (placing premium on text of statute).
71. See Baker, 2012 WL 5499497, at *5 (“The text of the statute plainly contains no such
additional requirements, and absent any ambiguity, the words of the statute itself are
dispositive.” (citations omitted)). This approach is not the only or best way to uncover
legislative intent. See, e.g., United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (advocating for most holistic approach to statutory interpretation). It
is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the courts will start by looking at
the statutory text. See, e.g., BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006) (“We start, of
course, with the statutory text.” (citations omitted)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself.”). Under the “plain meaning rule,” these words
should be interpreted using their ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance,
be sought in the language in which the act is framed . . . .”); Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274
F.3d 137, 141 (3rd Cir. 2001) (“Because it is presumed that Congress expresses its intent
through the ordinary meaning of its language, every exercise of statutory interpretation begins
with an examination of the plain language of the statute.” (citations omitted)). Federal courts
still frequently employ the historic rule that, when the language of the text is unambiguous, the
analysis ends there—no other mode of interpretation is necessary. See, e.g., Caminetti, 242 U.S.
at 242 (holding that “[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning,
the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need
no discussion.” (citations omitted)). However, the Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions,
advocated for a more holistic approach to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In determining whether Congress has
specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to
examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.”); Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
484 U.S. at 371. The Court has argued that the inquiry should not end at the statutory text
because of the potential for error. See Train v. Colorado Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S.
1, 10 (1976). A “superficial examination” of a statute might lead a court to incorrectly believe
the text of a statute is unambiguous, and looking beyond the text can correct those assumptions
and enable the court to more accurately ascertain legislative intent. See id. (“When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be
no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial
examination.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940))). While the court has not necessarily been consistent in
its approach, specifically with respect to when the plain meaning rule should end the inquiry
versus when a more holistic approach should be taken, the goal has remained consistent—to
uncover legislative intent. See, e.g., Nat’l R. R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R. R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (holding that “even the most basic general principles of
statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent” (citation
omitted)); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. at 544 (“This duty requires one body of public
servants, the judges, to construe the meaning of what another body, the legislators, has said.”).
Regardless of whether they strictly adhere to the plain meaning rule or advocate for a more
holistic approach, all agree that when the language of the text is ambiguous, the court must
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the courts have given short shrift to the appropriateness of the disgorgement
remedy in this context even though it is an argument consistently raised by
defendants.72 Thus, in order to analyze the appropriateness of disgorgement as a
remedy under section 304, it is relevant to consider the history of the
disgorgement remedy and how it has been used in the securities laws context.73
D. A History of the Disgorgement Remedy
Disgorgement is an “ancient remedy” that has been used across many areas
of the law.74 In recent years, disgorgement has become increasingly popular in
the securities law context.75 Despite its popularity, its application has been
inconsistent across the circuits.76
It is unclear whether disgorgement is an appropriate remedy under section

consider other rules of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 381
(2013) (noting that canons of construction and policy considerations come into play if statutory
text is ambiguous). This includes, but is not limited to, looking to the statutory scheme and
common law principles. See John Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002: The Case for a Personal Culpability Requirements, 59 BUS. L. 1005, 1036–37, 1040
(2004) (suggesting that courts should consider liability provisions in existing securities laws
when interpreting section 304); see also Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant Maynard
L. Jenkins to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 24 (“When Congress legislates, it is presumed
to do so against a background of established common law principles . . . .” (citing Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. at 371)); Defendant Michael a. Baker’s Motion to Dismiss at
*6, S.E.C. v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS, 2012 WL 5499497(W.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2012) (No.
1:12-CV-00285) (“Statutes must be read holistically with an eye toward the overall statutory
scheme.” (citations omitted)); Kimes, supra note 5, at 823 (“If a provision of a statute is
ambiguous, it should be read together with the entire statute.”). Kimes argued that courts, when
interpreting section 304, must consider the statutory scheme of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as well
as other securities laws. See id. The Supreme Court will decline to adopt a specific
interpretation when it would contradict common law principles, unless Congress has clearly
specified the intent to do so. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 281 (2003) (standing for
proposition that “unusually strict rules” should only be applied in situations where Congress
has clearly “specified that such was its intent”). In Meyer, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute, which made officers liable for employees’ actions, for its
application of “nontraditional vicarious liability principles.” See id. at 280–81. The Court held
that “[a]bsent special circumstances, it is the corporation, not its owner or officer, who is the
principal or employer . . . subject to vicarious liability for the torts committed by its employees
or agents.” See id. at 286. They refused to, in the absence of an express provision evidencing
Congress’s intent, “impose[] this special duty of protection upon individual officers or owners
of corporations . . . in respect to the corporation’s unlawfully acting employee.” See id.
72. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Peter L.
Jensen’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 24, at 18; see also Notice of Motion
and Motion by Defendant Maynard L. Jenkins to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 24, at 12.
73. For a discussion of the history of the disgorgement remedy in the securities laws
context, see infra notes 74–88 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1413, 1416
(2016) (writing that disgorgement is “ancient remedy” that “applies across a spectrum of
contexts”).
75. See Kirk, supra note 54, at 133 (“Disgorgement has become the routine remedy for
a securities enforcement action.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S.E.C. v.
Berlacher, No. 07-3800, 2010 WL 3566790, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010))).
76. See id. at 187 (writing that “the courts have struggled with applying the remedial
intentions of Congress”).
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304 if the statute is read without a personal misconduct requirement.77 Few courts
interpreting this statute have squarely addressed the question.78 Nevertheless, it
is clear that in the securities law context, disgorgement has historically and
consistently been considered a remedy to be applied against a wrongdoer.79 A
recent Supreme Court decision reinforces this notion.80 In Kokesh v. S.E.C.,81 the
Court ruled that SEC disgorgement is a penalty under section 2462 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 The Court gave three reasons for this ruling.83
First, disgorgement is imposed upon individuals who violated public laws,
meaning that the violation is committed against the United States, not any
particular individual.84 Second, SEC disgorgement is a punitive measure,
meaning it is meant to serve as a deterrent.85 Lastly, SEC disgorgement is not
always compensatory, meaning the disgorged compensation is paid to the courts,
who are responsible for determining how the funds are dispersed.86 The Court
may have limited its holding in a footnote by stating that the opinion should not
be interpreted as calling to question “whether courts have properly applied
disgorgement principles” in SEC enforcement proceedings in the past.87
Nevertheless, it seems likely that the holding will seriously limit the SEC’s ability
to seek disgorgement as a remedy moving forward, especially in a section 304
enforcement proceeding, which is a “penalty” or “punitive measure” that is meant
to deter.88
77. See Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant Maynard L. Jenkins to Dismiss the
Complaint, supra note 24 (arguing that disgorgement is remedy used to punish wrongdoers).
78. See S.E.C. v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1115 (9th Cir. 2016); see also S.E.C. v. Jenkins,
718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073 (D. Ariz. 2010).
79. See S.E.C. v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing that
courts have consistently held that “[t]he primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter
violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains” (citations
omitted)); see also S.E.C. v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS, 2012 WL 5499497, at *7 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 13, 2012) (“[D]isgorgement on equitable grounds is generally limited to cases in which
the officers themselves have engaged in wrongdoing.” (citations omitted)); Neer v. Pelino, 389
F. Supp. 2d 648, 654–55 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that sections 304 and 306 are similar in that
both provide for reimbursement of wrongdoing officer’s compensation).
80. See Kokesh v. S.E.C., 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643–44 (2017). Although Kokesh was
decided after Jensen, its holding is relevant to the discussion of disgorgement in the federal
securities laws context.
81. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643–44 (2017).
82. See id. at 1643 (“SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty within the meaning of §
2462”).
83. See id.
84. See id. (describing first principle that shows SEC disgorgement is penalty).
85. See id. (stating that primary purpose of disgorgement is deterrence).
86. See id. at 1644 (describing different functions and uses of disgorged funds).
87. See id. at 1645 n.3 (“Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion
on . . . whether courts have properly applied disgorgement principles in this context.”).
88. See Wrongdoing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining wrongdoing
as “an instance of bad or immoral behavior”); see also Wrongdoer, COLLINS ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/wrongdoer
[https://perma.cc/YBM8-6Q6E] (last visited Sept. 15, 2017) (defining “wrongdoer” as “a
person who acts immorally or illegally”); Wrongdoer, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/wrongdoer [https://perma.cc/3BBF-JNV8] (last
visited Sept. 15, 2017) (defining wrongdoer as “[a] person who behaves illegally or dishonestly;
an offender”); Brad S. Karp et al., Five Year Statute of Limitations Applies to Claims for
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III. THE FACTS OF S.E.C. V. JENSEN
In 1999, Defendant Peter Jensen started what would become an incredibly
successful business venture when he founded Basin Water, Inc. (Basin), a
corporation which designed and manufactured water treatment units.89 He would
thereafter serve as CEO of Basin for several years.90 During his time as CEO,
Jensen hired the co-defendant, Thomas Tekulve, who was then responsible for
the company’s financial structure.91 This included putting the appropriate
controls into place before taking the company public in 2006.92 During their time
as CEO and CFO of Basin, Jensen and Tekulve, respectively, certified quarterly
and annual reports on behalf of the company.93 In 2008, both defendants resigned
from their positions.94 Thereafter, the company filed a restatement with the SEC,
amending and restating financial reports that were filed with the SEC in 2006 and
2007, at which time Jensen and Tekulve still held their positions as CEO and CFO
of Basin.95
After reviewing these restatements, the SEC alleged that Basin had failed to
comply with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in its preparation
of financial reports and that, as a result, Jensen and Tekulve had received
hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensation through salary, bonuses, and
shares of Basin stock.96 In 2011, the SEC brought this action against the
defendants, alleging the defendants were required to repay incentive-based
compensation they made during the years in question pursuant to section 304 of
Sarbanes-Oxley.97 Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled for the defendants

Disgorgement Brought by the SEC, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG .
(June 12, 2017) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/12/five-year-statute-of-limitationsapplies-to-claims-for-disgorgement-brought-by-the-sec/
[https://perma.cc/QZW5-K7V9]
(noting that concerns over scope and availability of disgorgement remedy may “re-emerge in
litigation” moving forward).
89. See S.E.C. v. Jensen, No. CV 11-5316-R, 2013 WL 6499699, at *1, *4 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 10, 2013) (providing factual background for claim), vacated, 835 F.3d 1100, 1116 (9th
Cir. 2016).
90. See id. at *1 (describing defendant Jensen’s role at Basin).
91. See S.E.C. v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing defendant
Tekulve’s role at Basin).
92. See id. at 1104–05.
93. See Jensen, 2013 WL 6499699, at *1 (providing facts of case).
94. See id. (providing factual background for claim).
95. See id. at *2, *31 (describing issuing of restatements which triggers section 304).
96. See Jensen, 835 F.3d at 1106 (providing SEC’s allegations against defendants).
However, it was established at trial that Jensen did not receive any incentive-based
compensation during 2006 and 2007, and any stock off which he profited during those years
was stock he received when he founded the company in 1999. See Jensen, 2013 WL 6499699,
at *25 (providing district court’s factual findings). It was also established at trial that “Tekulve
did not profit from Basin’s decision to recognize revenue on any of the disputed transactions”
because “his salary nor his bonuses were linked to Basin’s revenue or stock price.” See id.
(providing factual findings which partly refute SEC’s claim regarding incentive-based
compensation).
97. See id. at *27–30 (listing allegations that are basis for SEC’s claim against
defendants). The SEC also alleged violations of 17(a), (b), and (c) of the Securities Act, issuer
reporting violations under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, and record-keeping violations
and misrepresentation to accountants under Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act. See id.
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on all counts.98 The SEC appealed, challenging several factual and legal
conclusions reached at trial.99 One of the legal conclusions challenged on appeal
was the district court’s interpretation of section 304 as requiring personal
misconduct on part of the officer.100 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
aforementioned legal conclusions on appeal.101 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
held that personal misconduct of an issuer’s CEO or CFO is not necessary to
trigger the disgorgement remedy.102
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT TAKES A DRACONIAN
APPROACH TO SECTION 304 IN S.E.C. V. JENSEN
The Jensen court held that the SEC’s interpretation of Section 304 was
correct because it (1) tracked the plain language of the statute; (2) was supported
by the legislative history and purpose of the statute; (3) was consistent with the
holdings of the district courts that have addressed the issue; and (4) was consistent
with the court’s previous conclusions that “the reimbursement provision is an
equitable and not a legal remedy.”103 First, the court looked to the plain language
of the statute and found that “[t]he clause ‘as a result of misconduct’ modifies the
phrase ‘the material noncompliance of the issuer,’” which suggests that it is the
issuer’s misconduct, not that of the CEO or CFO, that is relevant.104 The court
suggested that the history of the statute supported such an interpretation, noting
that the report from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs emphasized an intention to expand the SEC’s enforcement powers.105
The Jensen court went on to compare the Senate bill with the House bill.106
It noted that the House bill provided for disgorgement of compensation from an
officer only “if such officer or director engaged in misconduct resulting or, or
made or caused to be made in, the filing of a financial statement.”107 In contrast,
the Senate bill, which was ultimately signed in, tweaked the language to simply
state “as a result of misconduct” generally.108 According to the court, this showed
98. See Jensen, 835 F.3d at 1104 (providing trial court’s holding).
99. See id. (detailing procedural posture of case).
100. See id. (detailing legal conclusions that are challenged on appeal). The other legal
conclusion challenged on appeal was the district court’s interpretation of Rule 13a-14 as only
providing a cause of action against CEOs and CFOs who completely fail to file required
certifications, but not for officers who unknowingly certify false or misleading statements. See
id.
101. See id. (reversing district court’s decision).
102. See id. (ruling on section 304 scienter requirement). The court held that “[t]he
disgorgement remedy authorized under SOX 304 applies regardless of whether a restatement
was caused by the personal misconduct of an issuer’s CEO and CFO or by other issuer
misconduct.” See id.
103. See id. at 1114–16 (describing holding of court).
104. See id. at 1114.
105. See id. at 1115.
106. See id.
107. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 107-418, at 31
(2002).
108. See id. (comparing language of Senate Bill against language of House Bill).
Specifically, the Senate Bill required CEOs and CFOs to personally certify financial statements,
while the House Bill did not. Mark Jickling, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002: A Side-by-Side
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that Congress had consciously chosen not to include a personal misconduct
element.109 In other words, the court opined that the differences between the
language of the House bill and the “as a result language” of the Senate bill
“suggests that Congress knew how to draft a statute that would limit the
disgorgement remedy to cases of officer or director misconduct, and chose not to
do so.”110
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that while no other circuit court had
addressed the issue, most district courts that have done so have reached the same
conclusion—no personal misconduct element is required.111 Like most district
courts that have addressed section 304, the Ninth Circuit only briefly mentioned
the question of whether disgorgement is an appropriate remedy in this context.112
The court called the reimbursement provision an equitable remedy, not a legal
one, and noted that precedent allows federal courts to recover ill-gotten gains “for
the benefit of the victims of wrongdoing” whether or not those “gains” are in the
hands of the original wrongdoer or some third party who profited off that
wrongdoing.113
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: AN ARGUMENT FOR RETRACTING THE CLAWS AND
REQUIRING PERSONAL MISCONDUCT
In its analysis, the Jensen court purported to follow the plain language of the
statute and the district courts below it in interpreting section 304.114 While such
methods are not invalid, the court regrettably turned a blind eye to other modes
of interpretation and information that would have required a different
conclusion.115 First, other sections of Sarbanes-Oxley should have been
considered in order to maintain a coherent and cohesive statutory scheme.116 In

Comparison of House, Senate, and Conference Versions, U.S. Congressional Research Service,
Order
Code
RL31483,
9-10
(July
26,
2002),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20020726_RL31483_4643ff95130f94c80da9f0451e9ac
c782fd8d1d9.pdf. The Senate Bill provided for forfeiture of trading profits and bonuses
received in the 12-month period before a restatement was made as a result of misconduct; the
House Bill, by contrast, simply asked the SEC to consider whether disgorgement of insider
trading profits was appropriate, and if so, to adopt such rule. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. (citing S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (D. Ariz. 2010)); see
also S.E.C. v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 615, 625 (W.D. Tex. 2014); S.E.C.
v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS, 2012 WL 5499497, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2012); S.E.C.
v. Geswein, No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4541303, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011).
112. See Jensen, 835 F.3d at 1116.
113. See id. (“[A]mple authority supports the proposition that the broad equitable powers
of the federal courts can be employed to recover ill-gotten gains for the benefit of the victims
of wrongdoing, whether held by the original wrongdoer or by one who has received the proceeds
after the wrong.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S.E.C. v.
Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998))).
114. See id. at 1114.
115. For a further discussion of other modes of interpretation and information the court
failed to consider, see infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
116. For a further discussion of SOX’s statutory scheme and how it might have
commanded a different conclusion, see infra notes 129-127 and accompanying text.
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the same vein, a different conclusion is necessary to prevent tension between
Sarbanes-Oxley, a relatively recent enactment, and other securities laws that have
formed the basis of this body of law for nearly a century.117 Third, the purpose
of the disgorgement remedy has been understood in all areas of the law as a way
to punish wrongdoers; the court’s interpretation of section 304 turns this longstanding presumption on its head.118 These reasons warrant rethinking the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation in favor of an interpretation requiring more consistent
with Sarbanes-Oxley itself, other federal securities laws, and the common law
understanding of disgorgement.119
A.

One of These Things Is Not Like the Others: Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Statutory Scheme

First, the court’s interpretation of section 304 is inconsistent with other
sections of the Act, particularly section 302.120 Section 302 requires that CEOs
and CFOs review annual and quarterly reports.121 In doing so, they must certify
that, to their knowledge, the report does not contain any false or misleading
material facts or omit any material facts and that, based on their knowledge, any
financial statement included in the report is accurate “in all material respects.”122
As a general matter, section 302 does not hold officers strictly liable for
inaccurate financial statements.123 Rather, section 302 merely requires that the
officers certify the accuracy of the financial statements to the best of their
knowledge and implement internal controls designed to prevent the filing of false
or misleading statements.124 Thus, so long as an officer does not (a) knowingly
or recklessly certify a misleading financial statement, or (b) fail to implement
internal controls designed to prevent this from happening, then an officer can
escape liability for the actions of others.125 Section 304 is a dramatic departure
from section 302 in that section 304 imposes absolute liability and does not
consider the officer’s knowledge, or lack thereof, nor does it require the officer
to do anything (i.e., implement internal controls) or punish them for failing to do
117. For further discussion of how SOX 304 fits into the broader securities laws context,
see infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
118. For a further discussion of the history and purpose of the disgorgement remedy, and
how it should have influenced the court’s decision, see infra notes 133-142 and accompanying
text.
119. For a discussion of an alternative interpretation that would avoid such
inconsistencies, see infra notes 143-155 and accompanying text.
120. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1028; see also Kimes, supra note 5, at 824; Defendant
Michael a. Baker’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 6; Notice of Motion and Motion by
Defendant Maynard L. Jenkins to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 24, at 18; Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, supra note 24, at 18–19.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (a) (2012).
122. See id. § 7241 (a)(3). Section 302 also requires that these individuals certify that
they have “establish[ed] and maintain[ed] internal controls” designed to ensure the accuracy of
such reports, and that they have disclosed to the issuer’s auditors any fraud or “significant
deficiencies” that are detected. See id. § 7241 (a)(4)–(5).
123. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1028; see also Kimes, supra note 5, at 824 (stating that
“section 302 does not require a CEO to take total responsibility for the content of reports”).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(2).
125. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1028.
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so.126 If Congress had intended to craft section 304 in such a way that
significantly departs from other provisions within its statutory scheme, it would
have done so clearly and explicitly.127
B. If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: Looking to Decades-Old Securities Laws for
Guidance
The way the Jensen court interpreted section 304 is not only inconsistent
with other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is also at odds with securities
law generally.128 While there are other securities laws that impose strict liability,
all of these laws allow the officer to disclaim liability by a showing of good faith
or due diligence.129 Securities laws, with the exception of section 304, can be
126. See id. at 1029. Kelsh poses the following thought-provoking question in his
analysis of section 304:
If Congress had in fact intended to impose a form of absolute liability that is inconsistent not
only with the existing structure of the federal securities laws, but also inconsistent with other
provisions of the very Act in which it was passed, would it not have been rational to explain
itself more clearly?
See id.
127. See id. (arguing that if Congress had intended section 304 to be a departure from
other provisions of securities laws, then it necessarily would have had to explain itself). Kelsh
suggested that, given the “careful limitations on officer liability in section[] 302,” had Congress
intended to make such an extreme departure in section 304, it is likely they would have done so
clearly and explicitly. See id. The Ninth Circuit should have followed the Supreme Court’s
holding in Meyer and recognized that, in the absence of clear congressional intent, the courts
should not interpret a statute in such a way that clearly departs from common law principles.
See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 281 (2003) (declining to interpret statute in way that would
represent marked departure from common law principals in absence of clear and explicit
congressional intent); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133
(2000) (writing that “we must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which
Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude”); cf.
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (declining to find that Congress would have
“consciously abandoned its policy of furthering Indian self-government” with subsequent
enactment in absence of clear expression). The courts can reasonably expect that Congress,
should they desire to create law that significantly departs from common law principles, will do
so explicitly. See id. Of course, the converse argument has been made: courts have argued that
if Congress wanted section 304 to have a personal misconduct element, it could have easily
drafted it to include one. See S.E.C. v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1115 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Congress
knew how to draft a statute that would limit the disgorgement remedy to cases of officer or
director misconduct, and chose not to do so.”); see also Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1023 (“If
Congress had intended for the remedy to apply only in those instances in which the misconduct
was on the part of the Covered Officer, the argument goes, it easily could have drafted the
statute to make this clear.”).
128. See Def. Michael a. Baker’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 8 (stating that statute
holding officers strictly liable for other’s misconduct is a “weapon unknown to eighty years of
federal securities regulation”); see also Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1024. Kelsh notes that “the
courts have long looked to the overall context of the securities laws in interpreting ambiguous
provisions therein.” See id. at 1024 n.113 (citations omitted). For example, in S.E.C. v.
National Securities, Inc., the court stated that “the interdependence of the various sections of
the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress
has chosen.” 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969).
129. See Defendant Michael a. Baker’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 8; see also
Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1026. For example, section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
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broken up into three general categories: (1) laws that hold individuals liable for
their own conduct, and provide a defense based on the individual’s state of mind;
(2) laws that make individuals liable for their own actions but do not provide a
defense based on state of mind; and (3) laws that impose liability on individuals
for the actions of others, but provide a defense, or allow the individual to disclaim
liability based on their state of mind with respect to that action.130 The third
category holds individuals vicariously liable for the actions of others but provides
certain “good faith” defenses.131 Reading section 304 to impose strict vicarious
liability on officers for the misconduct of other employees would create a fourth
category of securities law: one that imposes liability on officers for the actions of
others, but fails to provide a defense based on the officer’s mental state.132
C. Punishment Without Crime? The Ninth Circuit Fails to Consider the
Purpose of Disgorgement
Finally, by finding that the SEC could seek the remedy of disgorgement
absent personal misconduct, the court failed to apply accepted principles of
common law equity.133 It is well established that disgorgement is designed to
prevent conscious wrongdoers from profiting off of their wrongdoing.134 SEC
disgorgement has long been understood as a penalty designed to target
wrongdoers.135 While the text of section 304 uses the word “reimburse” rather
provides that an individual will be held liable for the actions of any person under their control,
but it provides a complete defense for a control person who acted in good faith and did not
“induce the act or acts constituting the violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
130. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1024–25 (providing three general categories of
securities laws).
131. See Defendant Michael a. Baker’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71. One such
good faith defense can be found in 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) of the United States Code, which provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this
chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and
to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable (including to the Commission in any action brought under paragraph (1) or (3) of section
78u(d) of this title), unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (emphasis added).
132. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1026 (“A court that interpreted section 304 broadly
would have to ascribe to Congress intent to create a fourth category of liability: i.e., a liability
that is (i) vicarious and (ii) not subject to any defense.”).
133. For a discussion of the common law history of disgorgement, see supra notes 74–
88 and accompanying text.
134. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt.
a (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see also id. at cmt e.
135. See S.E.C. v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F. 3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The primary
purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving
violators of their ill-gotten gains.” (citations omitted)); see also S.E.C. v. First Jersey Sec., Inc.,
101 F.3d 1450, 1474 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The primary purpose of disgorgement as a remedy for
violation of the securities laws is to deprive violators of their ill-gotten gains, thereby
effectuating the deterrence objectives of those laws.” (citations omitted)); S.E.C. v. Blatt, 583
F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The court’s power to order disgorgement extends only to the
amount with interest by which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing.” (emphasis added)).
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than “disgorge,” the legislature intended, at least initially, to make disgorgement
the remedy available for a violation of the statute.136 The courts that have
interpreted the statute have consistently understood the word “reimburse” to
mean “disgorge.”137 Many of these courts also recognize that disgorgement is a
This
remedy designed to deprive wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains.138
understanding is inconsistent with the Jensen court allowing the SEC to seek
disgorgement from CEOs and CFOs who have not themselves committed any
wrongdoing.139
This departure from common law principles of equity is especially
problematic in the absence of any argument that disgorgement in the SEC
enforcement context is sui generis: a remedy unique to the securities laws
enforcement context, materially different from the common law remedy.140 If the
136. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 12 (2002) (asking the Commission to determine
when an officer or director should be required to “disgorge” profits gained, and if necessary,
promulgate a rule requiring the “disgorgement” of ill-gotten gains). For a discussion of the
legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see supra notes 38–48 and accompanying text.
The Jenkins court attempted to argue that, because the text of the statute utilizes the term
“reimburse” rather than “disgorge,” the preexisting common law theory of disgorgement is
irrelevant in this context. See S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078 (D. Ariz. 2010).
In doing so, the court failed to apply the rules of statutory interpretation it recognized earlier in
its opinion, which was that the court’s ultimate goal is to uncover Congress’s intent, and when
such intent is unclear using certain methods of statutory interpretation, the court should look to
additional canons. See id. at 1074.
137. See In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2008)
(recognizing that section 304 requires “non-compliant directors and officers to reimburse the
issuer by disgorging the profits of their noncompliance”); Mehlenbacher ex rel. Asconi Corp.
v. Jitaru, No. 6:04CV1118ORL-22KRS, 2005 WL 4585859, at *9 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2005)
(writing that violation of section 304 allows the SEC to recover “via the remedy of
disgorgement”).
138. See Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (stating that section
304 “address[es] wrongdoing of officers”). More recently, the Supreme Court has recognized
disgorgement in the securities laws context as a punitive remedy. See Kokesh v. S.E.C., 137 S.
Ct. 1635, 1643–44 (2017). For a discussion of the holding in Kokesh, see supra notes 80–88
and accompanying text.
139. See S.E.C. v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1116 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that
disgorgement is appropriate under section 304 even when there is no wrongdoing on the part of
the CEO or CFO). For a discussion of the court’s analysis in Jensen, see supra notes 103–13
and accompanying text.
140. See Kirk, supra note 54, at 145–46. Some have argued that disgorgement in the
SEC enforcement context is sui generis, meaning that common law principles of equity are
inapplicable. See id. Kirk established the theory of “regulatory equity,” which he refers to as
“the type of equity deemed by the Supreme Court to have been intended by Congress when
passing the securities laws.” See id. at 135, 145. He notes that this theory of equity is similar
in many respects to traditional common law equity; the fundamental difference between them
is the composition of the parties. See id. at 145. Unlike at common law, in the SEC enforcement
context, the complaining party, the SEC, has no legally protected interest. See id. at 145–46.
Importantly, the author does not argue that regulatory equity allows for the application of the
disgorgement remedy against a blameless individual. See id. at 142. In contrast, the author
appears to clearly support the notion that disgorgement, under both common law and regulatory
equity, targets wrongdoers, or people who have personally acted in some unlawful manner. See
id. at 141–42 (“Disgorgement deprives a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains . . . .”). In his article,
Kirk consistently refers to defendants in these SEC enforcement actions as “wrongdoers” and
supports the application of this principle of common law equity as consistent with the purpose
of securities laws. See id. at 151–52 (“[A] disgorgement order in the SEC enforcement context
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Ninth Circuit felt that SEC disgorgement in the enforcement context warranted
an alternative application of the remedy, they did not state so in their opinion.141
Thus, the court failed to provide adequate reasoning for diverging from common
law principles and in doing so, contributed to a chaotic body of law plagued by
inconsistent application of the disgorgement remedy in the SEC enforcement
context.142
D.

Maintaining Harmony: An Alternative Interpretation Avoids
Inconsistencies

In order to avoid such an erroneous result, the Ninth Circuit should have
interpreted section 304 to be read with the same scienter requirement as section
302: “based on an officer’s knowledge.”143 Requiring that an officer at least have
knowledge of the misconduct that triggers a restatement would be consistent with
Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory scheme, which purports to hold officers liable “based
on what they knew rather than the title they held.”144 A knowledge requirement
would resolve inconsistencies between sections 302 and 304.145 Under the Jensen
court’s holding, sections 302 and 304 read together produce the following
problematic result: when senior officers certify the accuracy of financial
statements, they must only do so to the best of their knowledge, but should one
of these statements contain an error that requires it to be restated, the officer will
be held strictly liable, regardless of whether they were aware of such error or
inaccuracy.146 This could not be what Congress intended.147 Reading section 304
without a knowledge requirement would, as one legal commentator noted, render
section 302 meaningless.148 If section 304 will hold an officer vicariously strictly
liable regardless of their knowledge, or lack thereof, then the provisions of section
302 that require certification of financial statements “based on an officer’s
not only deprives the wrongdoer of benefits derived from unlawful conduct, but it also
effectuates the purposes underlying the securities laws, the protection of the investing public,
and the deterrence of future violations.”).
141. See Jensen, 835 F.3d at 1116 (stating that disgorgement is merited but failing to
note justifications for diverging from common law equity principles).
142. See Kirk, supra note 54, at 159. Kirk cites the fact that the courts, the SEC,
Congress, and legal commentators have “lacked precision” when speaking about the purpose of
disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context as the primary reason for its chaotic application.
See id. He notes that there is a lot of uncertainty in the application of disgorgement and
inconsistency across the circuits, “in some instances leaving defendants wishing they were in
the Second or the Eleventh Circuits, while in others finding the SEC longing for the Sixth or
Ninth Circuits.” See id. at 135.
143. See Kimes, supra note 5, at 826 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2012)). This would make CEOs and CFOs liable for negligent or reckless
behavior, and thus “avoid[] unlimited liability” while still “maintain[ing] the unique purpose of
section 304—to incentivize CEOs to rigorously root out misconduct and sign off on
certifications that are true.” See id. at 827.
144. See id. at 829 (writing that consideration of SOX’s statutory scheme, particularly
section 302, would require finding that officer had knowledge of wrongdoing before imposition
of liability); Defendant Michael a. Baker’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 6.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Kimes, supra note 5, at 826.
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knowledge” are useless and clearly contradictory.149 Requiring that an officer at
least have knowledge of misconduct to enforce section 304 would also be
consistent with securities laws generally.150 Such a provision would fit squarely
into the previously defined third category of securities laws that includes those
that hold individuals liable for the actions of others but enable them to disclaim
liability based on a lack of knowledge of those actions.151
Finally, requiring a CEO or CFO to at least have knowledge of misconduct
that results in the issuance of a restatement in order to enforce section 304 against
them is consistent with common law principles of equity and the historical
application of the disgorgement remedy.152 Disgorgement has been consistently
and historically applied against wrongdoers.153 A senior officer who does not
even have knowledge of a lower-level employee’s misconduct cannot be labeled
a “wrongdoer.”154 Therefore, reading section 304 to require, at the very least,
“knowledge” of misconduct on part of the officer would resolve the
inconsistencies created by the Jensen court’s holding while still effectuating
Congress’s goal of rooting out corporate misconduct.155
VI. THE CORPORATE LANDSCAPE IN THE WAKE OF JENSEN: CEO
OMNIPOTENCE REQUIRED
The Ninth Circuit’s holding might be the reinforcement the SEC needed to
start seeking disgorgement from innocent officers under section 304 with greater
frequency.156 Regardless, it remains unclear whether other courts will follow the
Ninth Circuit’s lead and reach the same conclusions.157 The court’s holding puts
149. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting § 7241(a)).
150. For a discussion of three main “types” of securities laws, see supra notes 116–18
and accompanying text.
151. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1024–25 (describing three categories that securities
laws generally fall into).
152. For a discussion of the history of the disgorgement remedy, see supra notes 74–88
and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of the history of disgorgement, see supra notes 74–88 and
accompanying text.
154. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 88 (defining wrongdoing); see also
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 88 (defining wrongdoer); OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
supra note 88 (defining wrongdoer).
155. See Defendant Michael a. Baker’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 71, at 7 (writing
that interpreting section 304 to require that CEOs or CFOs be aware of misconduct “would
implement Congress’s goal of improving financial reporting and disclosure without creating an
inconsistent standard for liability”).
156. See, e.g., O’Hara, supra note 9; see also Savarese & Carlin, supra note 33 (stating
that “this victory at the appellate level may lead the Commission to seek this relief with greater
frequency”); Richman, supra note 51 (stating that Ninth Circuit’s decision might increase risk
of SEC seeking disgorgement from innocent CEOs and CFOs).
157. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 1 (stating that Jensen’s “ultimate influence” is to be
determined); O’Hara, supra note 9 (“Whether other courts of appeal will agree with [the Ninth
Circuit’s] conclusion . . . remains to be seen.”); Richman, supra note 51 (stating that court’s
decision might influence courts in future cases). It is also unclear what effect, if any, the Jensen
concurrence will have on the Ninth Circuit’s holding, as it seemingly tempers an otherwise proSEC holding. See O’Hara, supra note 9 (noting that, by stating that the misconduct required to
trigger disgorgement under section 304 must be intentional, “what the Ninth Circuit gave with
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CEOs and CFOs at great risk by requiring them to have complete and perfect
knowledge regarding the conduct of their lower-level employees—even when
those employees go to great lengths to conceal information from them.158 Given
the complex internal structure of corporations, such precise monitoring may not
be feasible, yet senior officers are forced to roll the dice and hope that those
employees in charge of filing statements are both honest and diligent.159 This risk
may deter some qualified individuals from taking on the role of CFO or CEO or
lead highly-qualified and experienced executives to leave public companies in
favor of private equity, where they will not face the increased potential for
criminal liability brought on by Sarbanes-Oxley.160 Those that choose to take the
risks associated with these positions may waste valuable time on over-monitoring
when their talents could be put to better use.161
one hand, the concurrence might partly take back.”)
158. See S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072–73 (D. Ariz. 2010) (describing
situation that happened in Jenkins). This is what happened to the CEOs and CFOs in Jenkins.
See id. at 1073. There, the SEC filed civil and criminal complaints against two other officers
of the company, alleging that they had intentionally concealed the fraudulent scheme from
Jenkins. See id.
159. See Myers, supra note 1. John J. Carney, former securities fraud chief for the
Department of Justice, expressed similar concern over the holding, stating:
[I]t’s very scary for a certifier of financial statements. Assuming you are an honest, diligent
officer of the company, how do you get comfortable in an environment where the authorities
are targeting individual liability, and the courts are saying that even an innocent mistake might
form a basis for liability?
Id. (quoting John J. Carney).
160. See Lerner & Yahya, supra note 49, at 1383 (noting that many managers are fleeing
public companies because of Sarbanes-Oxley). Outback Steakhouse’s long-time CEO, Bob
Merritt, cited the increased time spent on regulatory matters during the two years following the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley as his reason for resigning. See id. (citing omitted). According
to him, he is not the only one frustrated by the increased regulatory burdens associated with
Sarbanes-Oxley; in an interview, he stated, “I don’t know of a single CFO of a publicly traded
company who hasn’t thought about quitting in the last six months.” See Barancik, supra note
38 (quoting Bob Merritt). Ron Paul, a CEO of a restaurant research company, reinforced this
notion, stating that “Sarbanes-Oxley has just raised the whole fear level in the public arena.”
See id. (quoting Ron Paul).
161. See Barancik, supra note 38 (writing about interview with former Outback
Steakhouse CEO Bob Merritt). According to Barancik, Merritt lamented the expansive
regulations implemented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which left “executives like himself with
little time for strategic planning or profit building.” See id.; see also Lerner & Yahya, supra
note 49, at 1385 (answering “[w]ho . . . will be ‘left behind’ as CEOs and CFOs” after SarbanesOxley?). The authors suggest that increased criminal penalties brought on by Sarbanes-Oxley
will result in the “model” CEO “flee[ing] for other environments.” See id. at 1385. The “ideal”
CEO will be replaced by two types of individuals: “bean counters” and “swashbucklers.” See
id. “Bean counters” are entrepreneurs “who delight in the minutia of regulatory compliance”
and will fail to take the necessary business risks and waste valuable time by “spending eighty
hours per week crossing every t, and dotting every i.” See id. at 1383, 1386. Even more
alarming are the “swashbucklers.” See id. at 1386. These individuals cannot be deterred by
increased criminal penalties; they are the “truly the ‘unrighteous.’” See id.; see also The Good,
The Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with
Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2125 (2003) (writing that SOX and other
recent legislative efforts “may do little to constrain dishonest executives and may instead
hamstring honest executives in their efforts to use codes effectively”).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 6

2018]

CORPORATE SCAPEGOAT

151

Given the increased risk brought on by Sarbanes-Oxley, it appears that CEOs
have begun demanding higher fixed salaries because that money is not subject to
disgorgement.162 In 2016, a study on the effects of section 304 on CEO
compensation showed that, when compared to “control” firms, firms that
frequently issue restatements and whose CEO is the chairman of the board
showed a notable increase in CEO salaries after Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment.163
From the results of their study, the authors concluded that “CEOs are concerned
about potential clawbacks, and powerful CEOs are able to receive higher
salaries . . . which are not subject to the [Sarbanes-Oxley] clawback
provision.”164 This represents a move away from the “pay-for-performance”
trend, which has been praised as one solution to the agency problem because
officers compensated based on how well the company performs have efficient
incentives to not appropriate and to work hard.165 Conversely, if their total pay
is largely made up of a “base salary,” and the portion of their pay that is based on
performance is marginal, officers have less incentive to perform well.166
Proponents of a broad interpretation of section 304 claim that such an
interpretation will encourage CEOs and CFOs to exercise particular care and
vigilance in implementing and maintaining a financial structure that ensures
agents act honestly when preparing financial statements, or at least guarantees
that any misconduct is detected before the statements are filed with the SEC.167
These individuals further suggest that a broad interpretation will give investors,
shareholders, and the general public a sense of security that officers of
corporations will not profit off of wrongdoing.168 However, such a broad
162. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1036–37 (suggesting CEOs and CFOs may begin to
demand higher fixed salaries); see also Natarajan & Zheng, supra note 38, at 20–21 (suggesting
that CEOs and CFOs have already begun to demand higher fixed salaries).
163. See Natarajan & Zheng, supra note 38, at 20–21.
164. See id.
165. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1035–36; see also Margaret M. Blair, Rationalizing
Compensation Systems for the Twenty-First Century, BROOKINGS, (Dec. 1, 1996),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rationalizing-compensation-systems-for-the-twenty-firstcentury/ (noting that “[a]dvocates of equity-based compensation systems for directors and
executives usually argue that tying compensation to stock performance aligns the incentives of
directors and executives with those of shareholders”); Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy,
CEO Incentives—It’s Not how Much You Pay, But How, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, (MayJune
1990),
https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not-how-much-you-pay-but-how
(writing that one way that is thought to align the incentives of CEOs and shareholders is to
structure salaries and bonuses in a way that provides “big rewards for superior performance”).
166. See Blair, supra note 165. Blair presents a hypothetical scenario whereby a
manager is compensated $80,000 in fixed compensation, versus $60,000 in fixed compensation
with an additional $20,000 in stock grants based on “firm-specific contributions.” See id. Blair
suggests that in the latter scenario, the manager would have greater incentive to confront
productivity issues earlier on – implying that officers receiving greater fixed compensation with
lower variable compensation have less incentive to perform optimally. See id.
167. See, e.g., Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1034 (“A broad form of liability is, therefore,
justifiable on the ground that it will maximize the incentive for Covered Officers to root out
misconduct and thereby avoid the need for restatements.”); see also List, supra note 14, at 249
(arguing that section 304, if properly clarified, “will target those inattentive officers who have
failed to find the corporate misconduct being perpetrated right under their noses”).
168. See Fichtner, supra note 17, at 77 (arguing that SEC’s failure to enforce section 304
more vigorously “has betrayed the sense of security it was supposed to have created for
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interpretation is not necessary and does not take into account the corporate
landscape at the time of Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment.169 Sarbanes-Oxley was a
response to the growing public concern after scandals like Enron.170 What made
these scandals particularly shocking, however, was the CEO or CFO involvement
that permeated them.171 This was the type of behavior Sarbanes-Oxley was meant
to target.172 Instead, the SEC has insisted in recent years on a broad interpretation
of section 304 that unnecessarily targets innocent officers instead of deterring
intentional misconduct by officers.173
The original goal of Sarbanes-Oxley could be accomplished through a much
narrower interpretation of section 304—one requiring personal misconduct.174
The personal misconduct element would not render section 304 moot.175 In fact,
had it been in place at the time of the Enron or WorldCom scandals, the SEC
could have enforced section 304, which would have required both CFOs to
disgorge their compensation because both individuals participated in personal
misconduct as the creators of the fraudulent reports.176
investors”).
169. See Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1007–08 (calling legislative response to corporate
scandals “dramatic” and Sarbanes-Oxley Act “a bombshell”). A broad interpretation would
have a negative effect “on (i) compensation practices, (ii) insurance, and (iii) the perceived
fairness of the federal securities laws.” See id. at 1035 (advocating for narrow interpretation of
section 304). Kelsh further noted that a narrow interpretation of Section 304 would still
accomplish a “meaningful purpose” without subjecting CEOs and CFOs to significant personal
liability. See id. at 1042. See also Kalani A. Morse, Much Ado About Nothing: Looking Past the
Drama of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Reevaluating the U.S. Delisting Trend Among Non-U.S.
Firms, 2 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. R. 87, 88 (2005) (explaining that SOX was enacted in
response to financial scandals and bankruptcies that caused investor panic and subsequent
“mass exodus of investors from U.S. securities markets”).
170. See Tosha Huffman, Note, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Where the Knee
Jerk Bruises Shareholders and Lifts the External Auditor, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 239 (calling Enron
scandal “the first wave of a tsunami of many corporate and auditor corruptions”); see also
Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1007–08; Morse, supra note 169, at 88.
171. See id. at 1005–06. For example, in the collapse of Enron, it was discovered the
corporation’s CFO, Andrew Fastow, was the “financial architect of, and key investor in, several
of the off-balance sheet entities,” which allowed him to profit both directly in his investments,
by taking on very little risk, and indirectly, by making the corporation’s performance appear
better. See id. This then allowed him to obtain substantial bonus compensation. See id.
Fastow’s deceptive behavior earned him millions, while investors lost billions. See id.
172. See id. at 1006–07 (calling political and legislative action in 2002 “responses” to
these highly-publicized corporate scandals).
173. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2016); S.E.C. v. Jenkins,
718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1072–73 (D. Ariz. 2010); S.E.C. v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS, 2012
WL 5499497, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2012); Slater, Exchange Act Release No. 34-74240,
at 2 (Feb. 10, 2015); S.E.C. v. Diebold, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release
No. AE-3137, 2010 WL 2199552, at *1 (June 2, 2010).
174. See Kimes, supra note 5, at 820 (arguing that personal misconduct should be a
prerequisite for section 304 liability). Specifically, Kimes suggests that “[c]onstruing section
304 with a scienter requirement reinforces the purpose of section 302 and creates a statutory
scheme that avoids contradiction.” See id. at 826. See also Kelsh, supra note 71, at 1041–42
(arguing that narrow interpretation of section 304 would still accomplish purpose of SarbanesOxley).
175. See id. at 1005–06 (providing factual details regarding Enron and WorldCom
scandals and executive officer’s personal misconduct in bringing about scandals).
176. Cf. id.
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It is unclear precisely what impact Jensen will have moving forward and
whether other circuits will take the same approach.177 Because the case is only
binding upon lower courts in the Ninth Circuit, the district courts of other circuits
will have the freedom to interpret the statute as they see fit.178 Even if other courts
take the Ninth Circuit’s approach, the court’s failure to address other major
ambiguities in the statute will leave defendant CEOs and CFOs with other
avenues by which to push back against enforcement.179 Thus, over fifteen years
after its enactment, it is unclear exactly what section 304 mandates, and until the
Supreme Court reviews such a case, CEOs and CFOS will continue to walk
around with a bullseye on their backs.180

177. See O’Hara, supra note 9 (writing that it is not yet clear whether other courts of
appeals will agree with Jensen court’s conclusion); see also McLaughlin & Cohn, supra note
38, at 3 (stating it is unclear whether other circuits would take same approach as Ninth Circuit
in Jensen).
178. Cf. Barbara Bintliff, Mandatory v. Persuasive Cases, PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING
LEGAL RES. & WRITING 83, 83–85 (2001), (stating that decisions of U.S. courts of appeals are
mandatory on district courts in that circuit).
179. See Ninth Circuit Supports Expansive Interpretation of SOX 304, supra note 50
(writing that because Ninth Circuit did not define misconduct defendants will still be able to
argue that section 304 does not require disgorgement); see also S.E.C. v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100,
1123 (9th Cir. 2016) (Bea, J., concurring) (addressing majority opinion’s failure to interpret
pertinent parts of statute).
180. See Myers, supra note 1 (making bullseye reference).
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